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Brous: Brous: Constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act:

The Constitutionality of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act: State
Sovereignty and Compulsory
Negotiations
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota1

I. INTRODUCTION
Indian tribes located within states that permit gambling are allowed to license
and operate gaming activities on Indian lands2 as long as these activities comply
with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act [hereinafter IGRA]. 3 Congress enacted
the IGRA to balance tribal autonomy and economic self-sufficiency with the state
police power seeking to control tribal gaming operations.4 In Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the IGRA and held that the IGRA
violated neither the Eleventh nor the Tenth Amendments.' This Note examines
the split of authority in the federal courts regarding the constitutionality of the
IGRA and postulates a Supreme Court determination on the issue.

1. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. Id at 275. Since 1989, South Dakota has authorized a state lottery, video lottery, limited card
games, slot machines, parimutuel horse and dog racing, and simulcasting. IA at 276. See also
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
3.
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988). The IGRA attempts "to provide a statutory basis for the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
4. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
5.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 280-81.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

The IGRA divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes, eachreceiving
different levels of state regulation.6 An Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate Class I gaming. 7 The National Indian Gaming Commission
(Commission) oversees Class I gaming,' although an Indian tribe may regulate
Class 11 gaming subject to IGRA parameters. 9 Class III gaming on Indian lands
is allowed only in states that permit such forms of gaming.' ° In addition, Class
m gaming must be authorized by a tribal ordinance, approved by the chairman of
the Commission, and conducted in accordance with a tribal-state compact."
The IGRA provides procedural mechanisms for the negotiation and
formulation of a tribal-state gaming compact between an Indian tribe and the
state.' 2 Upon request by a tribe for a tribal-state compact, the state "shall"
negotiate with the tribe "in good faith."' 3 Federal district courts have jurisdiction
to adjudicate disputes arising from a state's failure to enter into negotiations or
failure to negotiate in good faith.' 4 If the federal court determines that a state
failed to negotiate in good faith, it must grant the Indian tribe injunctive relief and
require the Indian tribe and the state to conclude a compact within sixty days. 5
If the parties fail to conclude a compact within sixty days, a court-appointed
mediator will select the best offer of either the Indian tribe or the state.' 6
Thereafter, if the state consents to the mediator's choice within sixty days, the
proposed compact becomes effective.' 7 However, if the state refuses to consent,
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, in consultation with the tribe, will
formulate a compact based upon the mediator's proposal, the IGRA, and state
law.' 8

6. Id at 275.
7. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). Class I gaming includes social gaining for minimal prizes and
traditional gaming of Indian ceremonies or celebrations. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).
8. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 275; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b). Class II gaming includes: bingo, lotto, pulltabs, punch boards, tip jars, non-banking card games, and banking card games operated on or before
May 1, 1988. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7A). The IGRA requires that Class II gaming on Indian lands
be permitted by the state, not prohibited by federal law, and be adopted by a tribal ordinance which
is approved by the chairman of the Commission. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A)-(B).
9.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 275.
10.
Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). Class IIIgaming includes: casino gambling, parimutuel
horse and dog racing, lotteries, and all other activities not defined as Class I or Class II gaming. See
25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
11.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 275; 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(1)(A)-(C).
12.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 275.
Id (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3XA)).
13.
14. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 276; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(AXi).
15. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 276; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) (iii).
16. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 276; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv-v).
17. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 276; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).
18. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 276; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
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On January 9, 1991, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (Tribe), in accordance

with the IGRA, requested that the State of South Dakota (State) negotiate a tribalstate compact which would authorize the Tribe to operate gaming facilities on
reservation land. 9 However, by August of 1991, after five "official" negotiations
between the Tribe and State officials, and three meetings between the Tribe and

the governor of the State, the parties had failed to produce a tribal-state
compact. 20 The Tribe filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota in April of 1992, alleging that: (1) the State violated the
"good faith" negotiation principle mandated by the IGRA; and (2) the State
violated tribal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21

In accordance with the

IGRA, the Tribe sought injunctive relief to compel the State to negotiate a
compact within sixty days.22
The Tribe asserted that the State's routine use of a "Flandreau" style compact
constituted a failure to negotiate in good faith.23 The Tribe contended that it
would be unreasonable to impose a "Flandreau" compact on the Tribe.24 In
particular, the Tribe alleged that its economic potential was limited by the State's
higher bet limits, gaming sites on tribal
refusal to negotiate a compact including
26

25
tnst lands, and traditional keno.
The State asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity from the lawsuit and
alleged that the IGRA violated the State's rights under the Tenth Amendment.

19. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 275.
20. Id at 276.
21.
Id at 277; see Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523 (D.S.D.
1993). The named defendants include: the State of South Dakota, Governor George S. Mickelson,
State Attorney General Mark A. Barnett, State Negotiator Grant Gormley, and State Negotiator John
Guhin (all collectively referred to as "State").
22. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 277.
23. Id at 277. The Flandreau Santee Tribe was the first tribe to enter into a Class III gaming
compact, pursuant to the IGRA, with the State of South Dakota (approved by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs on July 26, 1990). Id at 276. Similar to the case at hand, the Flandreau Santee Tribe also
sued the state after five months of unsuccessful negotiations. Id The State and the Tribe settled the
suit and executed a "Flandreau compact." Id. The "Flandreau compact" became the model compact
and has subsequently been executed between the State and five other tribes: the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe, March, 1991; the Yankton Sioux Tribe, June, 1991; the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe,
September, 1991; the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, April, 1992; and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,
August, 1992. Id
24. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 277.
25.
The Tribe contended that gaming operations should be authorized on two commercially
valuable Indian trust lands near Fort Pierce and Plums, South Dakota. Id.
26. Id
27. Id The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. The State contended that it did not waive its immunity by engaging in negotiations with
the tribe and that only the state legislature can effectively waive this immunity. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at
280. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The State contended that the IGRA unconstitutionally compels negotiation
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The district court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, holding that
the Eleventh Amendment barred the Section 1983 claim, but not the IGRA
claim.2" The district court concluded that the IGRA did not violate Eleventh
Amendment immunity because "no penalties can be assessed against a state for
failing to negotiate."2 9 Rather, a state only forfeits the opportunity to protect its
interests when it enters into a compact negotiation.3" The district court also held
that the IGRA did not violate the Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the
states because the State was not forced to negotiate a compact.3
Subsequently, the Tribe appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, and the State cross-appealed.32 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity claim by
acknowledging the Tribe's right to bring suit against the State.3 The court
reasoned that Congress had the authority to, 34 and unmistakably abrogated, the
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity by expressly providing for federal
jurisdiction over claims under the IGRA.35 The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the
district court's finding that the IGRA did not violate the State's Tenth Amendment
rights. The court construed the IGRA as presenting the State with a choice to
either negotiate a compact to protect its interest in overseeing gaming operations
within its borders or to ignore the Tribe's request to negotiate. 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The process of negotiation enables parties to resolve disputes or plan
transactions through discussion or reasoned argument.37 In negotiation, 38 parties
or their representatives enter into a series of exchanges in pursuit of a nonbinding

by abrogating a power reserved to the states. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 281.
28.
Cheyenne, 830 F. Supp. 523. The district court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state and state officials acting in their official capacity.
Id at 525.
29. Id at 526.
30. Id
31. Id.
32.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 278.
33. Id. at 281.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3. Congress, pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, exercises
plenary authority over Indian relations. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 280.
35.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 281. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7)(AXi) (1988). See also Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
36.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 281.
37. LEoNARD L RiSlIN & JAMEs E. WESTBROOK, DISPUrE RESOLIrMON AND LAWYERS 4 (abr.
ed. 1987).

38.

Negotiation is distinguished from mediation, wherein a neutral third party facilitates the

discussions. Id.
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settlement.39 However, the parties to a settlement may render it legally binding
by memorialization in contract.4 °

Generally, the structure of the negotiation process resembles one of two
widely-recognized orientations: adversarial or problem solving.41 In an
adversarial orientation, each party attempts to maximize their interest in a limited
resource to the other's expense, thereby often resulting in conflicting interests

between the parties.42 In a problem solving orientation, the parties cooperate in
order to meet each side's underlying needs by increasing the number of issues for
bargaining or expanding the dividable resources.43
Many federal statutes and agencies employ alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms for adjudicating disputes between the federal government, federal
employees, and private parties." Federal courts are divided on whether Congress
has the constitutional power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to
with an Indian tribe through the procedures
compel the states to negotiate
45
mandated in the IGRA.

A. The Eleventh Amendment46
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state by a private party,
including the state's citizens, by a foreign sovereign, or by an Indian tribe. 47
However, states may waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity and consent to
suit in federal court. 4" Congress also possesses the power to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity in certain circumstances.49
In Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,5" an Indian tribe sued to

compel Alabama to enter into a tribal-state gaming compact under the IGRA 5
The Indian tribe alleged that Alabama had not responded "in good faith" to the

39. Id.
40. Id. at 64.
41.
Id.
42. Id. at 47.
43. Id.
44. AM. JU. 2DNEW TOPIc SERVICE, Alternative DisputeResolution §§ 17-25 (1985). See also
29 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1988) (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). In the labor management
field, it is the declared policy of the federal government to make available government facilities for
conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of collective bargaining disputes
between employers and employees. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 3610, 6101-6114 (1988). In the case
of employment, housing, and age discrimination, the federal government is required to eliminate the
alleged unlawful conduct by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. See 28
U.S.C. § 2672 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
45. See infra notes 50 and 65 and accompanying text.
46. For the full text of the Amiendment, see supra note 27.
47. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. CL 2578 (1991).
48. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990).
49. Id.
50. 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
51. Id at 552.
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tribe's request for the negotiation of a compact authorizing Class IlI gaming
within the statutorily required period of 180 days.52 The Poarchcourt held that
the Indian tribe's lawsuit against Alabama was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, thus granting Alabama imuUnity. 53 The court found that: (1) the

Eleventh Amendment applied to the Poarch Indians' action against Alabama; (2)
Congress, pursuant to its plenary power granted in the Indian Commerce Clause,
did not have the power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by
enacting the IGRA; (3) Alabama did not waive its immunity by entering into
negotiations with the Indian tribe; and (4) no exceptions to a state's sovereign
immunity applied.54

Under facts similar to the Poarch case, a federal district court in Spokane
Tribe of Indians v. Washington" upheld Washington's sovereign imunuity

against a lawsuit brought under the IGRA. 56 The court reasoned that Congress
lacked the power to abrogate a state's immunity by enacting legislation pursuant

to the Indian Commerce Clause.57 The Spokane court relied on two United
58
States Supreme Court decisions: Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and
59
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico. In Cotton, the Supreme Court held that it
was inappropriate to apply legal theories from the Interstate Commerce Clause to

the Indian Commerce Clause.' In Blatchford, the Supreme Court distinguished
between the relationship of sister states under the Interstate Commerce Clause and
6
the relationship of states and Indian tribes under the Indian Commerce Clause.

The Supreme Court recognized that under the Interstate Commerce Clause, each
state waives its immunity with respect to other states, thus creating a "mutuality
of concession."62 By contrast, the Supreme Court noted that Indian tribes have

52. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i) (1993 Supp.).
53. Poarch,776 F. Supp. at 553.
54. Id.at 554-63. See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 657 (S.D.
Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (1 Ith Cir. 1994). Three exceptions to a state's Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity exist: (1) a state may consent to suit in federal court, or expressly or impliedly
waive its immunity from suit (see, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 2581
(1991)); (2) Congress may, within its power, abrogate a state's immunity (see, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989)); and (3) under certain circumstances, state officials may be
sued in their "individual capacity" for equitable relief (see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
55. 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
56. Id at 1061. Other federal courts have held that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 834 F.
Supp. 1341, 1345 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, No. 92-0613-JC, 1992 WL
540817 (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F.
Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
57. Spokane, 790 F. Supp. at 1061.
111 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (1991).
58.
59. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
60. Id.at 192; see infra note 117.
61.
Blatchford, IllS. Ct. at 2582-83.
62. Id at 2582.
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retained immunity from suits brought by the states.63 Based on principles of
mutuality, the Supreme Court reasoned that the states have retained their immunity
from suits brought by Indian tribes. In light of Cotton and Blatchford, the
Spokane court held that Congress did not have the power to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting the IGRA' due to the disparity in
Congressional power stemming from the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
Indian Commerce Clause.
65
In contrast, a federal district court in Seminole Tribe ofFloridav. Florida
held that Congress has the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity by enacting the IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause.' In noting
that the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause are derived
from the same constitutional source, 67 the court reasoned that the text did not
suggest that Congress' power to regulate Indian commerce was any less than its
power to regulate interstate commerce." The Eleventh Circuit recently reversed
the district court's decision,69 holding that the IGRA was enacted pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause, and thus, Congress did not have the power to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity. 70 Another district court in Kickapoo Tribe of
Indians v. Kansas1 postulated that Congress' power under the Indian Commerce
Clause may be greater than its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause due
to the federal government's traditional, plenary power over Indian affairs.72

63. Id at 2583.
64. Spokane, 790 F. Supp. at 1061.
65. 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (llth Cir. 1994). See alsoKickapoo
Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1993).
66. Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 660.
67.
Id at 662. The Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3.
68. Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 662.
69. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (1 Ith Cir. 1994).
70. Id. at 1026.
71. 818 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1993).
72. Id. at 1431. See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (Congress has
plenary power "to deal with special problems of Indians" and "to single Indians out as a proper subject
for separate legislation"). A similar sentiment is echoed in a treatise on federal law:
The power over Indian affairs is unusual in our federal system because it includes general
federal authority to legislate over health, safety, and morals.... IFlederal power over
Indians is 'plenary' in the sense that in Indian matters Congress can exercise broad police
power, rather than only the powers of a limited government with specifically enumerated
powers.
FELIX S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDEPAL LAW ch. 3, § Cl at 219-20 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,

1982).
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Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the restraints of the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves certain powers to the states or the people.74 In New
York v. United States, 75 the Supreme Court held that Congress can urge a state
to enact legislation that conforms to a federal regulatory program, but Congress
cannot compel the states to regulate.76
A federal court in Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma77 held that an
Indian tribe's suit under the IGRA was precluded by the Tenth Amendment
because the states could possibly be compelled to enact a Class III gaming
compact. 78 The Ponca court noted that the reviewing court must examine the
federal legislation to "determine whether Congress has properly 'encouraged a
State to conform to federal policy choices,' or impermissibly compelled state
'
regulation. 79
The Ponca court interpreted the IGRA to technically offer a choice
of action for a state, but concluded that the choice was meaningless.' The
Ponca court held that a critical alternative was missing because a state "does not
81
have the option of refusing to act" or refusing to regulate Class III gaming.

The court concluded that a real possibility of compulsion existed because a state
could be ordered by Congress, through the Secretary of the Interior, to enact a
A federal court in Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico'
gaming compact.'
adopted verbatim the reasoning and analysis of the Ponca court. In essence, the
Sandia court characterized the issue as "Congress [having] crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion. '
A federal district court in California recently considered the constitutionality
of the IGRA provisions compelling a state to negotiate a tribal-state compact.85

73. For the full text of the Amendment, see supra note 27.
74. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct 2408 (1992). In New York, the Court held:
[Tihe Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the states. The Tenth
Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
Id. at 2418.
75.
112 S. Ct 2408 (1992).
76. Id at 2435.
77.
834 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Okia. 1992).
78. Id. at 1347.
79. Id. at 1346 (quoting New York v. United States, 112 S. CL 2408, 2424 (1992)).
80. Id. at 1347.
9i. Id.
82. Id; -see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83. No. CIV 92-0613-JC, 1992 WL 540817 (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992).
84. Id, slip op. at 3 (citing New York v. United States, 112 S. CL 2408, 2428 (1992)).
85.
Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, CIV-S-92-812 GEB, 1993 WL
360652 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 1993); see also Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribes v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp.
1292, 1297 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that the IGRA does not violate the Tenth Amendment).
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In Rumsey Indian Rancheriaof Wintun Indians v. Wilson," California contended
that the IGRA unconstitutionally mandated it to negotiate a compact with an
Indian tribe.s7 The court used three levels of analysis in holding that the IGRA
did not violate the Tenth Amendment.' First, the court reasoned that the IGRA
did not require California to assume any regulatory responsibility, which courts
have traditionally held to violate the Tenth Amendment.89 Rather, the IGRA
offered California the opportunity to influence federal law and protect state

interests through the compact negotiation process.' Second, when California and
an Indian tribe failed to negotiate a compact, the IGRA did not coerce the state
into regulating the gaming.91 The court noted that "the federal government, and
not the state, assumes the full burden of regulating."' Finally, the court noted
that the legislative history of the IGRA exhibited that "Congress clearly was
cognizant of the Tenth Amendment when it acknowledged that a State need not
forgo any State governmental rights to engage in or regulate Class I gaming
except whatever it may voluntarily cede to a tribe under a compact."'93

IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A.

The Eleventh Amendment

In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with the State's allegation that its sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment could not be abrogated by Congress, but only by a State
waiver expressly enacted by the South Dakota legislature.9'
Circuit Judge
McMillian, writing for the appellate panel, rejected the State's allegation and
affirmed the district court's determination that the Tribe's lawsuit, pursuant to the
IGRA, was not barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity claim."
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that two exceptions to sovereign immunity rendered
the State's immunity claim ineffective.96
Under the first exception, the Cheyenne court, relying on Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,' held that Congress unmistakably intended to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity by expressly providing for federal jurisdiction over

86.
87.

CIV-S-92-812 GEB, 1993 WL 360652.
Id at *11.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id at *11-12.
Id
Id.
Id at *13; see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(vii) (1988).
Rumsey, 1993 WL 360652 at * 13.
Id (citing Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribes, 796 F. Supp. at 1297).
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 280.
Id at 281.
Id; see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
801 F. Supp. 655, 657-63 (S.D. Fla. 1992), revd, 11 F.3d 1016 (llth Cir. 1994).
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disputes under the IGRA.9" The Cheyenne court also noted that when Congress
possesses the power, it may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity." The
Cheyenne court noted that Congress derives its power to abrogate from two

sources: (1) the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which grants
Congress plenary authority over Indian relations; and (2) the "uniquely federal
issues raised when such authority is exercised."'0° In determining the extent of
Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, the Cheyenne court adopted
the holding in Seminole Tribe ofFloridav. Florida,which reasoned that Congress'
power under the Indian Commerce Clause was equivalent to its power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause, which includes the power to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity.1 0 1 Due to the IGRA's express grant of federal

jurisdiction over disputes arising under the IGRA, and Congress' legitimate power
under the Indian Commerce Clause, the court held that the IGRA sufficiently
Under the second
abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.' 2
exception to sovereign immunity, the Cheyenne court held that the State impliedly
consented to suit by actively engaging in tribal-state negotiations which benefitted
the state."0 3 The court reasoned that a state can not simultaneously receive a
benefit from the negotiations while retaining its sovereign immunity.'0 4 The
benefit conferred to the State was "being able to supervise how Indian gaming will
be conducted within the state."''

B. The Tenth Amendment
The district court held that the IGRA did not violate the Tenth Amendment
because under its provisions, a state is not forced to negotiate or regulate a
compact.' 6 On appeal, the State alleged that the IGRA violated the Tenth
Amendment by (1) imposing mandatory negotiation procedures on the states; and
(2) coercing the states to execute a tribal-state compact." The Cheyenne court
affirmed the district court by holding that the IGRA did not compel the State to
engage in negotiations and that the State was free to choose its own course of

98. Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 280.
99. Id; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989).
100.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 280.
Id
101.
102. Id
Id at 281; see Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 2581 (1991).
103.
104.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 281.
105.
Id It should be noted that other federal courts disagree concerning the level of state
participation in negotiations under the IGRA which constitutes an implied consent to suit "Ifsimply
engaging in negotiations is enough to constitute consent, the state was faced with the Hobson's choice
of negotiating and consenting to suit or refusing to negotiate and being sued for failure to negotiate."
Poarch, 776 F. Supp. at 557.
106. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
107.
Cheyenne, 3 F.3d at 281.
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action.'08 In reaching this decision, the court concluded that the IGRA permitted
several alternatives for a state that was sued under the IGRA.'" Under one
alternative, a state could continue to negotiate until a compact was formed.,"
Also, if negotiations failed, a state could wait for a judicial determination on
whether the state negotiated in good faith. The action would be dismissed upon
a finding of good faith or stayed for additional negotiations."' Lastly, a state
has the right to refuse to negotiate at all, thereby sacrificing the state's opportunity

to safeguard its interests through a compact."' Based on the different available
alternatives for states not complying with the IGRA, the Cheyenne court held that
3
the IGRA did not violate the State's rights under the Tenth Amendment."

V. COMMENT
A.

The Eleventh Amendment

Federal district and circuit courts are divided as to whether Congress has the
authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in order
to compel the states to negotiate a Class III gaming compact with Indian tribes,
pursuant to the IGRA. The split of authority rests primarily on different
interpretations of the Indian Commerce Clause.
The Cheyenne court adopted the reasoning of Seminole Tribe of Floridav.
Florida,"4 which construed the Indian Commerce Clause to vest powers in
Congress at least as broad as those granted to Congress under the Interstate
Commerce Clause,' including the authority to abrogate a state's immunity. In
holding that the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Seminole and Cheyenne line of
cases bases its reasoning on: (1) the clauses' common derivation from the
Constitution: Article I, Section 8, clause 3; and (2) Congress' traditional plenary
power over Indian tribes." 6 The first basis of the Seminole and Cheyenne
holdings may be tenuous in light of Supreme Court precedent which distinguishes
the different applications between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Despite the fact that the clauses derive from the same
constitutional source, the Supreme Court has noted that the function of each clause
differs due to the dissimilarity in structural relationship between the entities that

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
See supra note 65.
U.S. CONST.art , § 8, d. 3.
See supra note 67.
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are subject to each clause.' The function of the Interstate Commerce Clause
is to maintain free trade among the states,"l 8 whereas the function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary authority to legislate Indian
affairs." 9 The structural differences may justify the view that Congress does not
have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity based solely
on a shared constitutional derivationbetween the Indian Commerce Clause and the
Interstate Commerce Clause. If the Indian Commerce Clause includes the power
to abrogate, the power must attach from an independent source, not from its
textual location.
The Spokane 12 line of cases rejected the common derivation basis for equal
powers to Congress under both the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate
Commerce Clause. These federal courts relied on the reasoning of a Supreme
Court decision holding that a state's sovereign immunity must be overcome by a
source independent of 28 U.S.C. § 1362.21 Spokane and its progeny compared
the Supreme Court's "mutuality of concession" reasoning to the IGRA
analysis.' 22 Sister states surrender their immunity to each other under the
Interstate Commerce Clause, thus creating a mutuality of concession- However,
Indian tribes retain immunity from suit brought by states under the Indian
Commerce Clause, thereby preventing any mutuality of concession. Because
Indian tribes retain Eleventh Amendment immunity, the states should not be forced
to surrender their immunity. As a result, the Spokane line of cases held that
Congress did not have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.

117. See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free
trade among the States . . . [citations omitted], the central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs [citations omitted]. The extensive case law that has developed under the
Interstate Commerce Clause, moreover, is premised on a structural understanding of the
unique role of the States in our constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases
involving the Indian Commerce Clause. Most notably... [it is] inappropriate to apply
Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the context of commerce "among" States with
mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction to trade "with" Indian tribes.
Id at 192.
118. Id.
119. Id
120.
See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
121.
Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2583. In Blatchford, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1362 established federal jurisdiction over a claim brought by an Indian tribe
against a state, thereby abrogating the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Section 1362 provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or
band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The Supreme Court
has interpreted this section as failing in and of itself to "enable tribes to overcome ... [a state's]
sovereign immunity." Blatchford, 111 S. Ct at 2586 n.5.
122. Blatchford, 111 S. CL at 2582.
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In applying the "mutuality of concession" principle to the IGRA analysis, the
Spokane line of cases may have lost sight of the Indian Commerce Clause's
primary function: providing Congress with plenary authority over Indian affairs.
Congress also has the sole power to regulate Indian gaming with or without state
participation. If the states retain their Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress
may be frustrated in exercising its plenary authority due to contrary or inconsistent
regulations of the states. The IGRA necessarily requires the power of abrogation

in order to implement federal legislation.
Moreover, the Spokane line of cases incorrectly applied the "mutuality of

concession" principle to the IGRA analysis, because such a result overstates the
effect of a suit brought against a state under the IGRA. Although a state may be
sued under the IGRA for failing to negotiate in "good faith," a judicial finding
against the state does not penalize or harm the state. The suit is a mere formality.
If the state loses the suit, it still has the opportunity to either continue negotiations
in good faith or to withdraw from the negotiations. If the state chooses to

withdraw, the only cost to the state is the loss of an opportunity to negotiate a
tribal-state compact. Therefore, the state loses a right that it would not have even
possessed had it not been offered under the IGRA.
Congress' plenary authority over Indian tribes was the second basis of the
Seminole and Cheyenne holdings. This basis provides a more compelling reason

for finding that Congress has the authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. From inception in the Articles of
Confederation to memorialization in the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress has
possessed plenary power to regulate Indian relations.'23 In general, when
Congress acts pursuant to a plenary grant of authority derived from the
Constitution, its plenary power typically includes a power to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 124 For example, federal courts have widely
recognized that Congress may abrogate the states' immunity pursuant to the
following plenary powers:

power

over

the Interstate Commerce Clause;

extradition;""

war

powers

clauses; 2

25

congressional

Copyright

Act

123.
See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 658-60. See also Linda King Kading, Comment, State
Authority to Regulate Gaming within Indian Lands: The Effect of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
41 DRAKE L REv. 317 (1992). Prior to the 1950s, the states did not have any authority over Indian
tribes, which are traditionally considered sovereign nations. Id at 317-18. The federal government
was solely empowered to regulate Indian affairs through treaties with the tribes. Id. Since the 1950s,
courts have only narrowly allowed states to enforce criminal or prohibitory state laws within Indian
lands and have refused to extend enforcement of civil or regulatory state laws. Id. Even though the
states have an interest in preventing criminal activity in gaming, the regulation of Class III gaming
under the IGRA remains a civil/regulatory classification within the province of the federal government
Id; see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
124. See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 660.
125. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 15.
126. U.S. CoNsT. art IV, § 2, cl. 2. See County ofMonroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1128-35
(2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983).
127. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13. See Peel v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1074-82 (5th Cir. 1979).
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challenges; 28 and any enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 129 Due to
its well established plenary power over Indian affairs, the Supreme Court would
likely determine that Congress has the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity through enactment of the IGRA.
B. The Tenth Amendment
If Congress compels the states to regulate, the Tenth Amendment is
violated. 30 In determining whether negotiations are compulsory and constitute
state regulation under the IGRA, the core issue focuses on whether the states have
a legitimate right to refuse to negotiate without suffering any penalty.
The Cheyenne court held that the IGRA did not violate the Tenth
Amendment because the IGRA permissively allowed the states to negotiate a
gaming compact in order to protect state interests. The Cheyenne court construed
the IGRA to offer states the right to refuse to negotiate. In contrast, the
Ponca"' court held that the IGRA compelled states to negotiate because the
states do not have a right of refusal. The Ponca court determined that there was
Congress could command a state to enact state regulations
a real possibility that
32
governing gaming.'
If the right of refusal is legitimate, states cannot be penalized for refusing to
negotiate. The Rumsey court held that the IGRA does not penalize states who
refuse to negotiate. 33 Instead, a refusing state merely surrenders "an opportunity
to influence federal regulation of Indian gaming which it would not otherwise
have .

. .

. "'t'

The Rumsey court also held that if a state opts to influence

regulations, the IGRA only "requires that the state exercise that influence through
the compact negotiating process.""' The Rumsey court draws a fine line
between compelling negotiation and encouraging participation in negotiation.
It is most likely that states are not compelled to negotiate under the IGRA
because it allows a refusing state to remain absent from the negotiation process.
In practice, if a state refuses to negotiate in "good faith," it will be amenable to
a harmless lawsuit in federal court. After a determination that the state has failed
to negotiate in "good faith," the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
formulates a compact." 6 In such a situation, the state is not compelled to enact
or enforce the compact, but must remain absent from the regulation of Class III
gaming. The state would simply suffer the penalty of being denied the
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th
Cir. 1979).
129. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978).
130. See supra notes 75, 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77.
131.
132. Ponca, 834 F. Supp. at 1346-47.
133. Rumsey, 1993 WL 360652 at *12.
134. Id
135. Id.
136. See supra note 18.
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opportunity to take an active role in regulating Class I gaming, an opportunity
that the state could only seize by complying with the IGRA. However, if a state
chooses to influence the regulation of Indian gaming, the state must follow the
alternative dispute resolution procedures mandated in the IGRA.
The immediate effect of the Cheyenne holding is that Congress can abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Therefore, any disputes arising under
the IGRA between a state and an Indian tribe must be litigated in federal court.
The Cheyenne holding represents an affirmation of Congress' plenary power in
regulating Indian affairs. Congress will continue to hold the states subordinate to
congressional policy and regulation of Indian affairs.
The most significant element of the Cheyenne holding is that Congress will
continue to facilitate the resolution of disputes by imposing mandatory alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms in federally dominated areas of law. In general,
when the states accept and act on a right or power granted to the states by
Congress, the states must comply with the congressional limitations on that granted
power. In the context of the case at hand, as a condition subsequent to the states'
acceptance of a federally granted right, the states must follow the negotiation and
other alternative dispute resolution procedures mandatedby Congress. Therefore,
Congress will continue to resolve disputes and affect contract negotiations by
proliferating and mandating alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in federal
statutes.
The IGRA provides a constitutional and efficient set of alternative dispute
resolution procedures for the negotiation of a tribal-state gaming compact. By
implementing these procedures, states and Indian tribes can negotiate a Class I
gaming compact to most effectively meet the Indian tribes' need for economic
self-sufficiency and the states' need to oversee gaming within their borders.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the absence of a determination by the Supreme Court, and because
litigation under the IGRA has only recently arisen, federal courts will continue to
differ on: (1) whether Congress can abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
Immunity by enacting the IGRA; and (2) whether the IGRA violates the Tenth
Amendment by compellingthe states to negotiate with Indian tribes. In Cheyenne,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit answered in the affirmative to the first
issue and in the negative to the second issue. Furthermore, the well established
reasoning of the Cheyenne court will likely command a majority of the federal
courts presented with the above issues. The IGRA provides a constitutional and
efficient set of alternative dispute resolution procedures for a state and an Indian
tribe to utilize in negotiating a tribal-state gaming compact.
JOEL
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